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The Norwegian policy of cooperation in Education and Research as a soft-power tool for Norway's foreign policy
Rozsypal Pajerová, Anna ; Kasáková, Zuzana (advisor) ; Svobodný, Petr (referee)
This diploma thesis examines the Norwegian policy of cooperation in Education and Research as a soft-power tool for Norway's foreign policy. Within a European context, three levels of Norway's participation in Education and Research programmes will be analyzed. The first level is Norway's cooperation policy toward the EU, though as a weaker actor. The second is Norway's value of cooperation as an equal partner, which is typical in the Nordic region. And the third is cooperation via EEA Grants and Norway Grants, in which Norway is a dominant player. This thesis combines a theory of international cooperation and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's theory of soft-power, complex interdependence and asymmetry of relations between the participants. In the research, a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods are used. This thesis reveals that Norway decreases the financial spending to the areas where it has more influence and can utilize more of its soft power, while it also invests into areas where it plays the role of substandard actor. An explanation is found in the theory of international cooperation and the game of Chicken, where the longstanding and successful corporation strives to achieve a compromise rather than a win, i.e. to moderate any power fluctuation and strive for an equilibrium state.
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The Norwegian policy of cooperation in Education and Research as a soft-power tool for Norway's foreign policy
Rozsypal Pajerová, Anna ; Kasáková, Zuzana (advisor) ; Svobodný, Petr (referee)
This diploma thesis examines the Norwegian policy of cooperation in Education and Research as a soft-power tool for Norway's foreign policy. Within a European context, three levels of Norway's participation in Education and Research programmes will be analyzed. The first level is Norway's cooperation policy toward the EU, though as a weaker actor. The second is Norway's value of cooperation as an equal partner, which is typical in the Nordic region. And the third is cooperation via EEA Grants and Norway Grants, in which Norway is a dominant player. This thesis combines a theory of international cooperation and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's theory of soft-power, complex interdependence and asymmetry of relations between the participants. In the research, a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods are used. This thesis reveals that Norway decreases the financial spending to the areas where it has more influence and can utilize more of its soft power, while it also invests into areas where it plays the role of substandard actor. An explanation is found in the theory of international cooperation and the game of Chicken, where the longstanding and successful corporation strives to achieve a compromise rather than a win, i.e. to moderate any power fluctuation and strive for an equilibrium state.
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The Norwegian policy of cooperation in Education and Research as a soft-power tool for Norway's foreign policy
Pajerová, Anna ; Kasáková, Zuzana (advisor) ; Young, Mitchell (referee)
This diploma thesis examines the Norwegian policy of cooperation in Education and Research as a soft-power tool for Norway's foreign policy. Within a European context, three levels of Norway's participation in Education and Research programmes will be analyzed. The first level is Norway's cooperation policy toward the EU, though as a weaker actor. The second is Norway's value of cooperation as an equal partner, which is typical in the Nordic region. And the third is cooperation via EEA Grants and Norway Grants, in which Norway is a dominant player. This thesis combines a theory of international cooperation and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's theory of soft-power, complex interdependence and asymmetry of relations between the participants. In the research, a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods are used. This thesis reveals that Norway decreases the financial spending to the areas where it has more influence and can utilize more of its soft power, while it also invests into areas where it plays the role of substandard actor. An explanation is found in the theory of international cooperation and the game of Chicken, where the longstanding and successful corporation strives to achieve a compromise rather than a win, i.e. to moderate any power fluctuation and strive for an equilibrium state.
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